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Abstract
Current theories of reading comprehension have been based on the assumption
that cognitive patterns (schemata) are structural constructs, and credit for
the structural assumption is generally given to Bartlett (1932). In this
paper it is suggested that problems concerning the phenomenal nature of the
patterning aspect of cognition may be more readily resolved at a functional
level. It is also argued that Bartlett perhaps never meant his schema
theory to be one about the structural aspect of cognition. The
interpretation of his theory as such is perhaps no more than an oversight on
the part of current cognitive scientists. An alternative view of schemata
as phenomenally transient functional patterns is presented.
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The Schema: A Structural or a Functional Pattern
Currently, dominant theories of comprehension and cognition are schema
theories. They all assign a central role in comprehension to high-level,
domain-specific cognitive structures variously referred to as "frames"
(Minsky, 1975), "scripts" (Schank & Abelson, 1977), "schemata" (Rumelhart &
Ortony, 1977; Rumelhart, 1978), or "micro/macro-structures" (Kintsch & van
Dijk, 1978).
Indubitably, the notion of schema is a useful one. It not only refers
to elements and relations in the conceptual network (Ortony, 1978, p. 54),
but it also underscores the patterning aspect of cognition (Anderson, 1977).
Schemata further draw attention to the domain-specific nature of knowing.
More specifically, in contrast with traditional information processing
theories that emphasize processing, storage, retrieval, and utilization of
knowledge in general, schema-based research concentrates predominantly on
knowledge of particular domains.
Domain specificity is clearly a relevant issue. This is because
people's cognition and comprehension seem to operate in terms of specific
domains and in specific situations. Experimental psychological work based
on the notion of schema and related concepts has demonstrated that
comprehension of the same textual material varies from one specific domain
of knowing (one schema) to another. It makes a real difference whether or
not the subjects know that the passage they are about to read is, for
instance, about "washing clothes" (e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1972), whether
Structure or Function
3
they know what they are reading is about eating in a fancy restaurant as
opposed to shopping at a supermarket (e.g., Anderson, Spiro, & Anderson,
1977), buying as opposed to burglarizing a home (e.g., Anderson & Pichert,
1978), breaking out of jail as opposed to wrestling (Anderson, Reynolds,
Schallert, & Goetz, 1977), or finally, whether they find out later that the
female character of the passage they have read is a lesbian as opposed to a
heterosexual (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). Furthermore, people become experts
in specific domains. There are no such things as experts per se. Rather,
there are expert tennis players, expert readers, expert problem solvers,
expert clinicians, and so forth. It is perhaps this realization which
renders the use of nonsense syllables as (domain-independent) experimental
material nonsensical. In short, if common denominators concerning cognitive
functioning in general are to be discovered, they ought to perhaps be sought
where they are actually operative, i.e., in terms of specialized domains of
knowing.
Thus, conceptually and essentially, a schema is a domain-specific
relational cluster. Beyond this, however, the concept of schema remains,
theoretically, disturbingly vague. One reason for this is that the
metaphors cognitive scientists use (e.g., "link," "association,"
"connection," "pointer," etc.) to refer to the relations among schema
constituents are purely conceptual. The question of the phenomenal nature
of cognitive patterning has not as yet been addressed. In fact, given the
current state of the art, the problem of the phenomenal nature of schemata
remains a remote issue. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss how
cognitive patterning is phenomenally possible.
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The term phenomenal is meant to refer to the physical reality of
cognitive schemata and to the physical validity of the concepts used in
theorizing about them. It is presumed and emphasized that the phenomenal
validity of cognitive patterns is as inevitable as it is urgent. That the
phenomenal validity of the concepts under investigation is a necessary
precondition for scientific discovery is evident from many instances in the
history of science. True, the concept of liguht bulb, for instance, must
have been a purely conceptual notion for some (short?) time before the light
bulb was actually constructed. This is itself perhaps a necessary
precondition. But the usefulness of conceptual metaphors is contingent on
the scientist's firm belief in their phenomenal possibility as well as on
some "thinkable" basis for the belief. Purely conceptual metaphors with
mysterious phenomenal possibility or no phenomenal validity at all are
logical shuttles which only serve to delay the thought and investigation.
It was Edison's unshakable belief in the phenomenal possibility of the light
bulb, and a more or less clear notion about the nature of this possibility,
which led to its phenomenal reality, i.e., to the actual construction of the
light bulb. Without this final step, the concept would have been worth
nothing.
Early in this introduction I stated what I believe schemata are.
Before discussing the phenomenal nature of schemata, it must be also
clarified what schemata are not. The following section is aimed at this
issue.
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Unexplaininjg the Concept of Schema
The Schema as a Structural Construct
For many theorists who use it, the term schema has come to be
synonymous with the word structure. The schema-is-a-structure assumption is
clearly evident in the cognitive scientific literature and needs no
elaboration. What is perhaps not as obvious is what the term structure
(schema) is meant to represent. I will attempt to clarify this issue by
looking at the metaphors cognitive scientists often use to qualify or
describe the notion of schema and by considering the contrast often made
between the terms structure and process.
First, schemata are generally claimed to be pre-existing knowledge
structures stored in some location in the head. A schema is said to be a
collection of concepts and associative links together (e.g., Ortony, 1978,
p. 54) or "a cognitive template against which new inputs can be matched and
in terms of which they can be comprehended" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977,
p. 131). Furthermore, like any stored or storable entity, schemata are said
to be "searched," "found," "utilized," and "stored again." The following
excerpts from some often-cited sources in the literature of cognitive
science clearly illustrate this point:
The reader brings a large repertoire of knowledge structures to the
understanding task . . . Rumelhart puts the matter very well when he
says, "the process of understanding a passage consists in finding a
schema which will account for it." (Schank & Abelson, 1977, p. 10)
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According to "schema theories" all knowledge is packaged into units.
These units are the schemata. (Rumelhart, 1978, p. 3)
The entire memory system contains an enormous number of schemata and
memories. At any one time only a few of them are required and no
procedure of random search could possibly lead to their efficient
discovery. The search for likely candidate schemata must, therefore,
be somehow guided and it must be sensitive to the context. .
(Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 128)
The building block of the model is the "State of Schema." The SOS is a
representation of the subset of the information hypothesized to be
stored in a schema (or a set of related schemata). (Spiro, 1977,
p. 151)
The above paragraphs clearly reflect a belief that schemata are
relatively permanent structures (at least as permanent as the long-term
memory), that they are brought to the comprehension situation somewhat
ready-made, and that they have a substantive nature (which is as yet
unspecified) capable of being stored, searched, retrieved, and so forth.
One may also note the passive static character of these cognitive templates,
though some theorists might argue otherwise.
That the term structure refers to the relatively permanent,
substantive, pre-existent, and static aspect of cognition is evident from
the fact that cognitive scientists often contrast it with the term process
(see, e.g., Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Collins & Loftus, 1975, pp. 411-413;
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Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 100, pp. 127-128), which may be presumed to
point to the more transient and dynamic aspect of cognition. In this sense
the term process falls in the same category as the word function.
Bartlett (1932), for instance, contrasts structure with function
instead of process. However, for Bartlett, it is live biological structures
that function rather than object-like knowledge or mental structures. He
finds no necessity in appealing to mental structures in his account of
remembering. "Everything in this book," Bartlett states, "has been written
from the point of view of a study of the conditions of organic and mental
functions, rather than from that of an analysis of mental structure. It
was, however, the latter standpoint which developed the traditional
principles of association. The confusion of the two is responsible for very
much unnecessary difficulty in psychological discussion" (p. 304).
And indeed it is. The slight difference in terminology reflects a
fundamental difference in theoretical perspective. The term function as a
verb is intransitive. For Bartlett, live biological structures act. They
do not act upon some object-like entity. His is not an industrial-plant
metaphor. This is why Bartlett can do away with the notion of storage
entirely (p. 200). On the contrary, the term process is transitive; it
requires an object, i.e., some entity to get processed.
The Schema as an Explanatory Construct
While this paper is centered around the idea that the patterning aspect
of cognition must be treated as a problem to be resolved, many theorists
have used the schema as an explanatory construct. Schemata are often said
Structure or Function
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to be "employed in the process of interpreting sensory data, (both
linguistic and non-linguistic) in retrieving information from memory, in
organizing actions, in determining goals and sub goals, in allocating
resources and generally in guiding the flow of processing in the system"
(Rumelhart, 1978, p. 2). In short, "theorists have tended to regard
schemata as a panacea * . ." (Ortony, 1978, p. 54). Since it is not clear
how the concept of schema is capable of performing these "wondrous acts," as
Rumelhart calls them, one feels compelled to suggest that the term schema
only be used to refer to the purely patterning aspect of cognition and even
then as a problem to be resolved. I repeat the question posed early in this
paper: Just how is patterning phenomenally possible?
The Structural Assumption and the Problem of Patterning
The Nature of the Problem
The idea that schemata are relatively permanent, pre-existing knowledge
structures (cognitive building blocks, cognitive templates, etc.) with
constant internal relationships becomes paradoxical when the problem of the
phenomenal nature of cognition is considered. This is because one can
assert with confidence that there is no single element in the entire
cognitive network which can be said to belong, or be uniquely connected to,
one and only one schema. It is more likely that element E is a component of
schema A at one time and an element of B, C, or D at some other time. But
if this is the case, in what sense can it be claimed that E is more an
element of A than an element of B, C, or D? In other words, what does it
mean to say that elements of A form a structural associative knowledge
cluster?
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In order to conceptualize the magnitude of the problem, consider the
the metaphors often used to refer to knowledge networks. "Encyclopedia,"
"dictionary," or "thesaurus" are among the most common. Imagine, now, the
extent of crisscrossing of associations necessary to represent in structural
network form an encyclopedia of everything a particular average college
student, for instance, might know. Even if such a representation were
possible, a clearly questionable possibility, it would constitute a static
representation. Hardly anyone, however, would doubt the idea that the human
cognitive network is a highly plastic, highly dynamic network; the relations
involved are constantly in a state of change. As Bartlett (1932) states,
"since many 'schemata' are built of common materials, the images and words
that mark some of their salient features are in constant, but explicable,
change" (p. 214). Truely, the number of possible connections and
combinations (i.e., schemata) is indefinitely large. As long as purely
conceptual metaphors such as "link," "association," "pointer," etc. are
used, the problem remains masked. At a phenomenal level a structural
cognitive network seems impossible to imagine, if not simply impossible.
It is because of the requirement of "constant change" in the face of
constantly novel situations that the idea of schemata as pre-existing
structures becomes paradoxical. As Anderson (1977) points out,
It could not be that people have stored a schema for every conceivable
scene, event sequence, and message. . . . Even if the nominal stimuli
in two situations were the same, people change. They come to similar
situations with different perspectives and different intentions; they
Structure or Function
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play different roles. It follows that people do not function by
selecting the right template from a great mental warehouse of templates
abstracted from prior experience. The process must be more dynamic.
(p. 421)
Neither can it be said that a schema is a collection of independently
linked concepts. In an associative pattern, if the link with one of the
elements is missing, the remaining fragment may preserve the pertinent
characteristics. It seems more reasonable to assume that a schema is a
gestalt. In this sense, combine might be a better metaphor than link or
associate. The whole is more than the collection of its elements. If
oxygen is taken out of water, the property of "waterness" is lost, because
this property is not independently present in the components. Similarly, if
an element of a cognitive pattern is taken out or replaced by another
element, the resulting combination gives rise to a different pattern with
its unique properties. "Opening a door" is not the same as "opening a
bottle," "opening one's mouth," "opening a discussion," or "opening a can of
worms" (see Anderson & Ortony, 1975; Goetz, Anderson, & Schallert, 1979).
If Wittgenstein is right, words like "open," "game," etc. do not depend on a
common underlying structure whether it be called "a core meaning," "a
schema," or something else.
The Relationship Between the Neuronal Network and the Cogjnitive (Conceptual) 1
Network
Sooner or later, theories of cognition will have to deal with the
Structure or Function
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problem of the relationship between the neuronal network and the conceptual
network. However, given the structural assumption and the overly
complicated picture of the conceptual network it provides, the issue seems
as remote as the related problem of phenomenal nature of patterning. This
is perhaps why some ingenious attempts at building psychoneurological
models, as made by Hebb (1949), have remained largely ignored.
Some cognitive scientists, however, have demonstrated a willingness to
speak in neurological terms. Collins and Loftus (1975), for instance,
consider their semantic network model quasi-neurological (p. 411). This is
perhaps because they use neuronal terms such as "activation," "threshold,"
and "summation" in the context of their structural conceptual network. A
cogent summary of their model is given in the following paragraph from
Ortony (1978).
In their recent modification and improvement of the Quillian (1968)
network model of semantic memory, Collins and Loftus (1975) introduce
some additional processing assumptions. The first is that when a
concept is processed activation spreads from it in a decreasing
gradient; the second is that release of activation from a concept
continues at least as long as that concept is processed; and a third
relates to decrease of activation over time. The fourth addition is
that activation from different sources summate and that there is a
threshold which determines whether or not an intersection is found.
Added to these are two additional structural features. First, that
semantic similarity plays a larger role in the organization of the
Structure or Function
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network, and second that the names of concept, i.e., words, are stored
in a lexical network, which is to some extent independently "primable."
(p. 55)
Quasi-neurological semantic network models, therefore, speak of
activation spreading in a structural conceptual network. However, it is
possible that cognition can be characterized without the need to hypothesize
such associationistic networks. As Bartlett (1932) suggests, this would
also eliminate a great deal of "unnecessary difficulty in psychological
discussion" (p. 304). Whatever the case may be, the relationship between
the neuronal and the conceptual networks must be theoretically clarified
before neurological concepts can be used in the psychological domain.
Toward a Solution to the Problem of the
Phenomenal Nature of Cognitive Patterning
The Schema as a Functional Construct
Underlying cognitive patterns, according to the structural assumption
discussed above, are relatively permanent, frame-like, knowledge structures
with constant internal connections. Counter-intuitive as it may at first
seem, it is entirely conceivable, however, that, phenomenally, the
patterning aspect of cognition is a functional rather than a structural
organization. The question of the phenomenal nature of cognitive clusters
may be posed in the following manner: Given schemata A and B which share
elements (e.g., the schema for "super-market" and the schema for
"restaurant"), is it the case that when A is in a state of functioning
(activation) B is also preserved (stored?) in some intact structural form?
Structure or Function
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A structural assumption, it seems, is committed to a positive answer to
the above question. In fact, schema theorists assert that even in cases
where the same generic schemata are used in comprehension of a particular
passage, that is, in schema-theoretic terms, an instantiated copy of them is
constructed, "what gets stored in memory is, in effect, a copy or partial
copy of these instantiated schemata" (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 116).
By contrast, if it is assumed that the frame-like aspect of cognition
is a functional phenomenon, the need does not arise for preservation of
multiple copies. Furthermore, there will be no need for hypothesizing an
independent frame-like structure corresponding to each and every independent
functional pattern. The following section is intended to elaborate on these
ideas.
An Analogy
In order to clarify the functional-structural distinction, I will use
what I will hereafter refer to as the light-constellation analogy. The
problem is how to conceptualize a phenomenally possible system which would
generate functional patterns not necessarily based on independent frame-like
structural entities. Imagine a room containing a few hundred lights, each
having a different shade of color. Now in this simple constellation, every
time a subset of the lights goes on, it generates a unique but phenomenally
transient functional pattern. Here phenomenal means some not-purely-
conceptual entity such as physical energy; transient means when the lights
go off the pattern no longer exists in its frame-like form; and functional
means some kind of apparatus functions and this leads to some product
Structure or Function
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(light). Now, when a given cluster of lights goes off, some of its
component lights can participate in some other cluster to generate another
unique pattern. Thus, between two patterns that share elements, when one is
functional the other is non-existent and vice versa.
If, on the other hand, one assumes that the cluster-like characteristic
of the system is structurally-based, the only way that the system could be
phenomenally possible would be by constructing a new light cluster for each
new observed pattern. This would mean, of course, that multiple copies of
the same structural entities (lights) would be required which would, in
turn, require storage and working space accommodation for an infinite number
of structural patterns.
The light-constellation analogy is deceptively simple. Even at the
elementary level outlined above, it has tremendous explanatory power.
First, it clearly illustrates how an infinite number of unique functional
patterns could be generated based on a limited number of structural
elements. Secondly, there is no need for an independent storage mechanism.
Thirdly, for each functional pattern, the unique functional characteristic
of the whole is clearly greater than (or rather different from) that of the
individual component parts: the shade of color generated by a given subset
cluster will be different from that generated by individual lights. And,
most importantly, there will be no need for an independent structural
pattern corresponding to each distinguishable functional pattern.
However, a functional assumption need not imply that there is
necessarily no independent structural basis underlying a given functional
Structure or Function
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pattern. All it says, I reiterate, is that there is no independent frame-
like structural entity corresponding to each distinguishable cognitive
pattern. It is conceivable, for instance, that for a given cluster, a
single element would be structurally available to signal, when activated,
functioning within the entire cluster. Inversely, a single element could
also be structurally available to function (get activated) in response to
the functioning of a particular cluster. Such single elements could provide
one way for the system to keep record of past functional patterns. For
instance, a single element specialized to respond to a particular functional
pattern (A) could, in turn, signal activation of a second functional pattern
(B) generating, "Oh, yes! This is old. I recognize it." And this could, in
principle, happen every time A got activated.
Cognition as a Functional Phenomenon
The structural-functional distinction may be further clarified by
considering two distinct meanings of the term cognition. The first meaning
could be represented by such terms as "perceiving," "knowing,"
"understanding," "remembering," and so on. The second meaning would refer
to the products of such acts. The product of the act of knowing, for
instance, is knowledge. The functional approach would be directly concerned
with the first meaning: What sort of live biological elements (analogous to
the lights in our constellation apparatus) give rise to these acts? How do
the elements relate? What causes the initiation and cessation of
functioning in the elements (the turning on and the turning off of the
lights)? How, when, and why do new elements enter the scene? The
Structure or Function
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functional approach assumes that patterning "is created" by the neuronal
elements functioning in unison. When functioning of a set of elements
ceases or when the elements participate in some other pattern, the previous
pattern is no longer in existence; though it can, of course, be recreated.
In short, based on the functional assumption, the cognitive (conceptual)
network is a functional network and as such the network as a whole remains
an abstraction--only portions of it can be said to phenomenally exist at
different times but never the network as a whole.
The structural approach, on the other hand, is a product-centered
approach. It raises a different set of questions: How is knowledge
processed, retrieved, and stored? How is it organized? And so forth.
I used a light-constellation analogy to demonstrate how unique patterns
may emerge. The analogy may be extended, for the sake of comparison, to
encompass the structural assumption. What is needed is a camera to take a
picture of each unique pattern which is generated. Only then the need would
arise for a storehouse for the pictures; and only then one may speak of
searching, finding, retrieving and so on. The organization of the pictures
in the storehouse would then create a problem; and only then one might speak
of copies and originals or tokens and types.
The constellation analogy, without necessarily suggesting inherent
correspondence with the human cognitive system, demonstrates how a highly
generative phenomenal system is possible. It does this without necessarily
appealing to such independent conceptual constructs as "code," "memory,"
"storage," etc. (so reminiscent of faculty psychology) or "link," "token,"
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"pointer" "similarity," "comparison," etc. (which are deep-seated remnants
of associationism). I consider this a major advantage of the functional
approach. Bartlett (1932) argued against both of these traditions and
pointed out that "the force of the rejection of associationism depends
mainly upon the adoption of a functional point of view . . ." (pp. 307-308).
Bartlett also prophetically stated:
In various senses, therefore, associationism is likely to remain,
though its outlook is foreign to the demands of modern psychological
science. It tells us something about the characteristics of associated
details, when they are associated, but it explains nothing whatever of
the activity of the conditions by which they are brought together.
(p. 308)
Bartlett used the term "remembering" to emphasize the functional aspect
of the influence of the past on the present. Unfortunately, with few
exceptions (e.g., Bransford, McCarrell, Franks, & Nitsch, 1977), Bartlett
has been generally misunderstood (see below). This is perhaps due to the
deep-seated influence of conceptual (as opposed to phenomenal) metaphors
such as the above (e.g., memory). It may still take many direct and
ingenious attacks like that of Bransford et al. to unexplain these metaphors
and many years before they are annihilated, roots and all.
The functional approach, using the light constellation analogy,
provides an alternative conceptualization of the human cognitive capacities.
It demonstrates that a lot of these "faculties" are no more than different
aspects of the same mechanism.
Structure or Function
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However, the application of the light-constellation analogy may strike
some readers as too mechanistic to be meaningful with respect to the human
cognitive system. Admittedly, this feeling is somewhat justified. Clearly,
metaphors present both desirable and undesirable aspects. Therefore,
caution must be exercised in their use and interpretation. In the present
paper, the analogy was introduced to allow a clearer conceptualization of
how "patterning" is possible as a functional phenomenon. To the extent that
it has served this purpose, the analogy has been successful. It must also
be noted, on the other hand, that the metaphor can also safely permit an
overall picture of the cognitive system in a most revealing fashion.
Whether or not it will develop into a mechanistic perspective will largely
depend on the details that will have to be filled in. We are told that the
"pump" metaphor helped physiologists to conceptualize the functioning of the
blood circulation system. It can be seen now that the metaphor did not
reduce the latter, an amazingly flexible and complex system, to the status
of the former, a highly rigid mechanistic apparatus.
Historical Overview
It is fashionable among current cognitive scientists to credit Bartlett
(1932) for the notion of schema as a structural construct. The following
illustrative excerpts were chosen to reiterate what may be obvious to many
readers:
A central theme in work of the kind referenced above is the postulation
of interacting knowledge structures which . . . we shall call
Structure or Function
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"schemata." The term finds its way into modern psychology from the
writings of Bartlett (1932) and it is to him that most workers
acknowledge their debt (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 100).
He [Bartlett] hypothesized that to-be-remembered (TBR) information is
assimilated into pre-existing holistic cognitive structures (schemata)
in such a manner as to lose particular identity. (Spiro, 1975, p. 4;
italics added)
Building upon Bartlett's (1932) original work . . . several story
grammars have been constructed to describe the structural basis of
story understanding. . . . The theoretical assumptions of these
grammars specify that memory for stories is a constructive process,
resulting from the interaction between incoming information and pre-
existing cognitive structures, or schemata, containing knowledge about
the generic characteristics of stories. (Stein & Nezworski, 1978,
p. 2)
I believe it is worth considering just how representative of Bartlett's
work this current trend in cognitive science is. The following quotations
should provide a clue:
Schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts
stored in memory. (Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977, p. 101; italics added)
Structure or Function
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What is stored, given that reconstruction must be based upon some
stored information? Some details from discourse are specifically
stored. . . . (Spiro, 1977, p. 157; italics added)
I suspect that Bartlett would have greatly disliked to see such
metaphors as "stored," "memory," etc. used in reference to his theory. In
fact he washed his hands of them when he objected to Head's (1920) use of
these concepts in the following fashion:
* . . Head gives away far too much to earlier investigators when he
speaks of the cortex as a "storehouse of past impressions." . . . A
storehouse is a place where things are put in the hope that they may be
found again when they are wanted exactly as they were when first stored
away. The schemata are, we are told, living, constantly developing,
affected by every bit of incoming sensational experience of a given
kind. The storehouse notion is as far removed from this as it well
could be. (p. 200)
My objection to conceptual metaphors of schema theorists may strike the
reader as an insignificant point. However, I agree with the suggestion
implied by Bransford et al. (1977) that the nature of conceptual metaphors
used is an issue of utmost importance in scientific exposition. A
scientist's use of concepts represents the way she/he perceives the world.
It is the difference between "seeing" the apple fall and "seeing" the earth
attract the apple. The first is a routine incident of no significance. The
second is a scientific discovery. A scientist's use of concepts could also
Structure or Function
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represent the degree of accuracy he or she exercises in scientific
expositions.
What I would judge to be inaccurate language and/or faulty perspective
is also evident in the interpretation of Bartlett's idea of schema
reconstruction. Here is an example from Spiro (1979):
. . . What has already been read is not remembered as it was originally
understood; rather, inferences about what must have transpired are made
from what is known about later developments. A parallel may be drawn
with the activities of a paleontologist who inferentially reconstructs
a dinosaur utilizing an assortment of bone fragments (bits of stories)
and knowledge about the anatomy and physiology of other dinosaurs
(prototypic knowledge about the situations described in a given story).
See Bartlett (1932) for further discussion of the reconstruction
notion. (p. 5)
Spiro's concept of reconstruction is much closer to the literal meaning
of the term than to Bartlett's notion of reconstruction. For Spiro, bone
fragments are needed because "reconstruction must be based on some stored
information." The light-constellation analogy showed that this is not
necessarily the case. Elements participating in reconstruction are active
in themselves. For Bartlett, reconstruction begins with an attitude, a
momentary setting directed toward a schematic orientation. Bartlett states,
"As I have shown, to serve the needs of biological adaptation interests are
all the while increasing in diversity, in narrowness and in definiteness.
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So our range of search, when we have to attempt recall, tends to get more
and more refined" (pp. 312-313). Thus, for Bartlett, reconstruction is a
live biological function. The notion of dead dinosaur "bone fragments" is
as far removed from this as it can be. In fact, Bartlett disliked the term
schema fearing that it might lead to the very same type of interpretation.
He states:
. . . I strongly dislike the term "schema." It is at once too definite
and too sketchy. The word is already widely used in controversial
psychological writing to refer generally to any rather vaguely outlined
theory. It suggests some persistent, but fr agmentar_, "form of
arrangement," [italics added] and it does not indicate what is very
essential to the whole notion, that the organized mass results of past
changes of position and posture are actively doiag [italics in
original] something all the time; are so to speak, carried along with
us, complete, though developing, from moment to moment. Yet it is
certainly very difficult to think of any better single descriptive word
to cover the facts involved. It would probably be best to speak of
"active, developing patterns"; but the word "pattern," too, being now
very widely and variously employed, has its own difficulties. . .
(pp. 200-201)
I suspect that what Bartlett actually meant by the term schema is what
has been called elsewhere (Note 1) the "schema-of-the-moment." The term
accurately denotes the transient functional aspect of cognitive clustering.
Structure or Function
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However, the word transient need not indicate fleeting, momentary reactions
isolated from the past and the future. On the contrary, the schema-of-the-
moment is ordinarily very stable. It lasts, as Bartlett puts it, as long as
it is actively doing something. It inherits the influence of "past
functioning" en masse and cumulatively, the latter still being functional,
and builds upon it from moment to moment.
Thus the distance between Bartlett's concept of schema and that of the
current cognitive scientist, is vast indeed. This became evident to me
quite by chance when I began to draw excerpts from the literature bearing on
the notion of schemata as structural constructs for the purpose of citing in
this paper. Surprisingly, in a close reading of Bartlett's discussion of
the notion of schema (pp. 186-238, 301-313), I failed to locate a paragraph
which would confidently suggest that Bartlett meant schemata to be
structural constructs. On the contrary, I found plenty of evidence
suggesting that Bartlett's concept of schema may very well have been a
functional one. These paragraphs are cited as examples:
If Head is right, "schemata" are built up chronologically. Every
incoming change contributes its part to the total "schema" of the
moment in the order in which it occurs. That is to say, when we have
movements a, b, c, d, in this order, our "plastic postural model" of
ourselves at the moment d is made depends, not merely upon the
direction, extent and intensity of a, b, c, d, but also upon the
chronological order in which they have occurred. Suppose, for the
moment, that a "model," to continue to use this picturesque
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phraseology, is completed, and all that is needed is its maintenance.
Since its nature is not that of a passive framework, or patchwork, but
of an activity, it can be maintained only if something is being done
all the time. So in order to maintain the "schema" as it is--though
this is rather inaccurate language--a, b, c, d must continue to be
done, and must continue to be done in the same order. (p. 203)
There is, however, an obvious objection to all this. So far as the
"schema" is directly responsible for the attitude, it looks as if the
latter must itself be predominantly determined by the last incoming
incident of the mass of past reactions. But remembering often pretends
to be of an incident remote in time, and that incident is not, as in
the rote recapitulation method, now reconstructed by going through a
whole chronological series in order. If "schemata" are to be
reconstructed after the fashion that seems to be demanded by the
phenomena of recall, somehow we have to find a way of individualizing
some of the characteristics of the total functioning mass of the
moment. (p. 208)
It is important to note that Bartlett makes no pretense about knowing
how this functional mass of the moment comes about. More specifically,
unlike many current cognitive scientists who take the patterning aspect of
cognition for granted, Bartlett sees it as a problem to be solved. "Again I
wish I knew precisely," he points out, "how it is brought about and again I
can make only a few tentative suggestions" (p. 209). And the latter are
along the following lines:
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In the clearest and most definitely articulated cases, there first
occurs the arousal of an attitude, an orientation, an interest. Then
specific detail, either in image or in direct word form, tends to be
set up. Finally there is a construction of other detail in such a way
as to provide a rational, or satisfactory setting for the attitude.
(pp. 304-305)
One possible way to describe, metaphorically of course, how the
construction phenomenon may happen is to use the light-constellation
terminology. Then one can imagine that (under the influence of Bartlett's
prerequisite orientation arousal) some "lights" go on, some gain in
brightness, some go off, and still others gain in dimness. The final
product is a more or less coherent mass of the moment.
Bartlett emphasizes, and here I adopt Anderson's (1977) chemistry
analogy, that in addition to the composition aspect, there is yet a second
fundamental aspect, i.e., decomposition:
If any marked further advance is to be achieved, man must learn how to
resolve the "scheme" into elements and how to transcend the original
order of occurrence of these elements. This he does, for he learns how
to utilize the constituents of his own "schemes," instead of being
determined to action by the "schemes" themselves, functioning as
unbroken units. He finds how to "turn round his own schemata. . . .
(Bartlett, 1932, p. 301)
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The "decomposition" aspect of Bartlett's theory has not been
appreciated by researchers who have found the phrase "turning round upon
one's schema" unclear (e.g., Oldfield & Zangwill, 1942-1943). The problem,
we suspect, has arisen not because of some inherent vagueness in Bartlett's
theory, but because of researchers' failure to comprehend his functional
approach. In functional terms, since relations are assumed to be
phenomenally transient, composition and decomposition become relatively
easier to conceptualize.
In order for the reader to get an intuitive feeling for the type of
functional reorganization discussed above, I will present here a summary of
one of the passages which I have used in my experiments concerning this
intriguing phenomenon. As the reader goes through the summary, we suggest
she/he keep the light-constellation analogy in mind. True, at this level of
complexity the analogy is rather unrealistic and could be misleading.
Nevertheless, I believe it does provide the intended general framework with
the reader filling in any necessary details her/himself.
The story, adopted from Thurmond (1978), is about a nurse, called
Marilyn, who leaves the hospital where she works to go home after a late-
night shift. The hospital is presumably in the downtown of a large city.
When on the freeway, she notices that she is running out of gas and becomes
terrified. She remembers the recent surge in muggings, beatings, and so on
in the area. Finally, she decides to go to Gabriel's gas station for gas.
Gabriel has always seemed to her to be a pleasant person and she knows him
by going to his station for gas.
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Gabriel fills the tank, returns the change from the twenty, and, as she
is ready to leave, he suddenly asks her to go inside the station office with
him to see some birthday present he has recently received. Marilyn refuses,
but Gabriel insists. She finally agrees. She parks the car out of the way
at his request in front of the office window and follows him inside the
office.
Once inside, Gabriel quickly locks the door and pulls a gun out of the
drawer. She becomes terrified and begins experiencing the symptoms of
shock. She sees Gabriel walking toward her. His lips are moving but she
cannot hear. She cannot defend herself and she yields to the pressure of
Gariel's hand on her shoulder forcing her to the floor. Gabriel is still
looking out of the window with the gun clutched in his hand.
Finally, she begins to hear what he is saying: " . . . Sorry I had to
scare you like that. I was scared myself when I saw that dude on the floor
in the back of your car. . . ."
There are perhaps many different ways to describe the somewhat
instantaneous reshuffling involved in the comprehension of this story. But,
I believe, the present functional approach presents the most straightforward
description.
Summary and Conclusions
Many psychologists would agree that patterning is a fact of cognition.
But the phenomenal nature of patterning presents a difficult problem. This
is because, in order to avoid postulating multiple copies of the same
cognitive elements, patterns must share elements. As Bartlett put it:
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This complexity of "schematic" formulation means that many objects,
many stimuli, many reactions, get organized simultaneously into
different "schemes," so that when they recur, as, in the world we know
they are bound to do, they tend to set into activity various cross-
streams of organizing influence. (p. 302)
But sharing elements means breaking the relations in the pattern. One
way to solve this problem, and it may be the only way, is to postulate
transient relations. And one type of transient relation, and again this may
be the only type, is the functional relation of the sort described in this
paper. Those who agree with these statements would also note that
structural theories of cognition and comprehension are likely to run into
unresolvable problems of organization when, and if, they come to deal with
the issue of the phenomenal nature of cognitive patterning.
Some readers may argue that we are still far from dealing with the
phenomenal nature of cognition and that there are more immediate problems to
be resolved and more sophisticated techniques to be developed. This type of
argument I consider procrastination in the face of a difficult problem
rather than scientific logic. Means develop in response to needs; and it is
unlikely that one gets closer to a problem by simply avoiding it.
Unfortunately much psychological theory and research has been based on
a great amount of tolerance for vagueness. At the risk of repetition, I
will present the following paragraph, part of which was quoted earlier. It
is a clear but by no means an isolated example of vagueness:
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For all of the authors mentioned above, schemata truly are the building
blocks of cognition [italics in original]. They are the fundamental
elements upon which all information processing depends. Schemata are
employed in the process of interpreting sensory data, (both linguistic
and nonlinguistic) in retrieving information from memory, in organizing
actions, in determining goals and sub goals, in allocating resources
and generally in guiding the flow of processing in the system.
Clearly, any device capable of all these wondrous things must be
powerful ipdeed. Moreover, since our understanding of none of these
tasks which schemata are supposed to carry out has reached maturity, it
is little wonder that a definitive explication of schemata does not ye.
exist and that skeptics view theories based on them with some suspicion
[italics added]. (Rumelhart, 1978, p. 2)
The tolerance for vagueness characteristic of much psychological
literature is only partially justified by the difficulty of the problem.
One thing is certain: tolerance for vagueness is detrimental to progress.
I have argued that cognition is a functional phenomenon directly
created by the neuronal network. Based on this perspective, there is no
need to hypothesize a structural organization other than the neuronal
organization. Does this mean that in order to learn about cognition, one
would have to open the head and directly examine the neuronal organization?
Not necessarily. Obviously, inferences concerning the neuronal network, its
organization, and how it functions to create cognitive acts such as
perceiving, knowing, remembering, comprehending, thinking, and so on may be
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made based on observable products of these functions (e.g., linguistic
performance).
Viewing cognition as a functional rather than a structural phenomenon
raises some fundamental questions. With respect to research on reading
comprehension, for instance, at least two approaches are possible: (a)
concentrating exclusively on the analysis of text which corresponds to the
functional organization based on the present perspective or to the
structural knowledge organization based on traditional cognitive scientific
view, and (b) aiming at a characterization of a functionally explicit
neuronal system as a structural basis for cognitive functioning. Text
grammarians currently do the former. There are serious problems with such
an approach. First, as we saw earlier, there is no limit on the possible
number of functional patterns. Secondly, even if common denominators were
to be found, as one hopes they would be, they may not map the
characteristics of the system which should be of ultimate concern.
Analyzing the features of the pictures a camera takes may never tell
anything about what the camera itself is like. Text and story grammarians
need to seriously consider these problems.
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